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ABSTRACT 
Although information technology has improved our living standards, it has also 
provided criminals new ways to commit crime. Digital crime includes identity theft, 
online piracy, hacking, and terrorism. For combating digital crime, new techniques and 
tools emerge frequently in digital forensics. On the opposite side, cyber-criminals 
develop counter-techniques called anti-forensics, which aim to disrupt or manipulate 
forensic analysis of crime. This thesis investigated the effectiveness of some 
representative anti-forensic tools for data hiding, artifact wiping, and trail obfuscation. 
We found they varied considerably in effectiveness and a variety of countermeasures can 
be used against them. 
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New techniques and detection mechanisms emerge often in digital forensics. On 
the opposite side, cyber criminals develop new techniques against digital forensics, as well 
(Lillis, Becker, O’Sullivan, & Scanlon, 2016). The collection of those techniques are called 
as anti-forensics. Anti-forensics became a phenomenon after 2005. Initial techniques were 
very effective against forensic investigation. However, now we have detection and 
mitigation methods for individual anti-forensic techniques. This research examines some 
popular detection and mitigation techniques against anti-forensics. 
Garfinkel (2007) provided a well-accepted taxonomy for the anti-forensics: data 
hiding, artifact wiping, trail obfuscation, and attacks against forensic tools and processes. 
This research focused on anti-forensic tools. A tool can have multiple purposes, but we 
experimented with the most-used purpose of the anti-forensic tool.  The most effective and 
popular tool category is encryption since when a file is encrypted, forensic analysis cannot 
be conducted. Steganography is also popular, a data hiding technique.  
In this research, we provide detection or mitigation methods for each subcategory 
of anti-forensics. Some tool detection depends on recovering installation files, 
configuration information, and the use of specific “C” libraries. File streams can be 
detectable with PowerShell scripts. Network covert-channel detection requires retrieval of 
key data from the target system. Steganography detection depends on statistical analysis. 
Trail obfuscation requires an exploit, so keeping systems up-to-date and detecting 
an exploit is a viable mitigation method. When cyber-criminals use zip bombs or packers 
against forensic tools, we can stop them by using FTK Imager, TSK-Autopsy, or Magnet 
Forensics AXIOM. 
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Since the introduction of the first computers, information technology and digital 
devices have played significant roles in our daily lives. Cyber criminals and attackers have 
also been using information technology and digital devices for malicious purposes (Lillis, 
Becker, O’Sullivan, & Scanlon, 2016). Digital-forensic investigation has become an 
important part of the criminal investigation because of the increasing criminal usage of the 
computers (Lillis et al., 2016). Recently digital forensics is facing some challenges due to 
technical improvements in digital devices and information technology. Increases in storage 
capacity, improvements on network bandwidth capacity and communication speed, 
introduction of the device networks in the “Internet of Things,” and continuing 
development in mobile devices have created challenges to digital-forensic investigation. 
Those challenges include complexity, diversity, consistency, volume, and time 
management (Raghavan, 2013).  
As the importance of digital forensic increases, anti-forensic techniques emerge 
(Liu & Brown, 2006). This thesis defines and classifies anti-forensic techniques, and 
analyzes some representative tools for detecting and mitigating them. We first provide 
definitions and background on anti-forensic techniques, and describe some easy-to-use and 
publicly available ones. Chapter III covers implementation of selected anti-forensic 
techniques in more detail. Chapter IV covers detection and mitigation of those techniques 
and some tools to do so, and reaches some conclusions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ANTI-FORENSICS 
Foster and Liu (2005) demonstrated early implementations of anti-forensic tools. 
Liu and Brown (2006) described four aims of anti-forensic techniques: 
• Avoiding detection of malicious actions; 
• Disrupting the information collection during the forensic investigation; 
• Increasing investigation time required; and 
• Decreasing the validity of a forensic report or testimony. 
Other anti-forensic tools and techniques have started to emerge. The popular 
“Metasploit” framework now includes the anti-forensic tools Timestomp, Transmogrify, 
Slacker, and Sam Juicer in the MAFIA (Metasploit Anti Forensic Investigation Arsenal) 
which implements techniques of Liu and Brown (2006). Another researcher categorized 
anti-forensics in four categories as “data hiding, artifact wiping, trail obfuscation, and 
attacks against digital forensic tools” (Garfinkel, 2007, p. 78). This listed aims of anti-
forensics as: 
• Revealing the existence of the forensic tools; 
• Disrupting forensic analysis; 
• Attacking forensic examiners, and 
• Clearing the evidence of anti-forensic tool’s existence. (Garfinkel, 2007) 
Understanding anti-forensic techniques and tools requires understanding the 
digital-forensic examination process. It includes three main stages: acquisition and 
preservation, analysis, and presentation (Yusoff, Ismail, & Hassan, 2011). In addition to 
these, pre-processing and post-processing phases help the investigator to maintain the 
4 
integrity of the evidence and results. Figure 1 depicts the stages of a digital-forensic 
examination. Each stage has feedback to a previous stage.  
 
Figure 1. Digital Forensic Examination Stages. Source: Yusoff 
et al. (2011). 
The digital-forensic investigator finds valuable evidence during the analysis stage 
from the data obtained during the acquisition stage. So anti-forensic tools and techniques 
target mainly this stage. Some anti-forensic tools target the pre-processing and post-
processing stages as well. 
B. CATEGORIZATION OF ANTI-FORENSIC TECHNIQUES 
Because anti-forensics is an emerging area, new tools are emerging publicly every 
day. Jahankhani and Beqiri (2010) classify anti-forensics from tool-specific perspective: 
• Digital media wiping  
• Steganography  
• Privacy wipers  
• Rootkits  
• Homographic attacks  
5 
• File signature modification attacks  
• Encryption  
• Metadata anti-forensics  
• Slack space anti-forensics  
• Secure digest functions collision generations  
• Digital memory anti-forensics  
• Misleading evidence  
• Packers/binders  
• Forensic tools vulnerabilities/exploits  
• Resource waste  
• Forensic detections  
• Anonymous actions  
• Anti-forensics in flushable devices 
Tool-specific classification of anti-forensics focuses on tool categories. We 
followed four well-known categories in this research. 
• Data hiding 
• Artifact wiping 
• Trail obfuscation 
• Attacks against digital forensic tools and processes 
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C. DESCRIPTION OF ANTI-FORENSIC CATEGORIES 
This project analyzed and correlated anti-forensic tools. An open-source version of 
a tool was sought where possible. Otherwise, the tool selection of Conlan et al. (2016) was 
used. Appendix A lists the tools considered. 
1. Data Hiding 
Data-hiding techniques and tools use file-system, memory, or network capabilities 
of the operating system for hiding the digital data. Hiding tools, steganography, and 
encryption are closely related (Bender, Gruhl, Morimoto, & Lu, 2010). However, data 
hiding is a broader concept and steganography, rootkits, and encryption are specialized 
hiding techniques. Conlan et al. (2016) suggested subcategories of “data contraception, file 
system manipulation, hard disk manipulation, memory hiding and network-based hiding.” 
a. File System Data Hiding Tools 
The Microsoft Windows NTFS is a representative file system. NTFS organizes a 
“volume” or major subpart on a disk with a: 
• Boot Sector 
• Master File Table 
• File System Data 
• Master File Table Copy 
The Master File Table is the most important portion in an NTFS volume for forensic 
purposes (Bergel, 2007). When a file data is less than a cluster size, unused space occurs; 
if a file is larger than a cluster size it, becomes fragmented (Microsoft, 2003). A cyber-
criminal can hide data into unused spaces which occur when file-system data does not fill 
records or when it is fragmented.  
The UNIX and Linux operating systems use blocks for file-system structure, and 
unused or slack space occurs at the Data Block portion of the EXT4 file-system (“Ext4,” 
n.d.). Slack space provides a place for data hiding in both the Microsoft and UNIX/Linux 
7 
fil-system structures. Hiding data into slack or unused space is more effective in a Windows 
environment (Huebner, Bern, & Wee, 2006). Huebner et al. (2006) suggests that a 
successful data hiding should (1) hide from standard operating-system utilities, (2) have a 
low chance of being overwritten, (3) hide from the user interface, and (4) store a good 
amount of data. Slack-space data-hiding techniques meet those characteristics. MAFIA 
includes a slack-space hiding tool, Slacker, within the Metasploit framework. Slacker was 
first published in the Metasploit platform in 2006.  
b. Memory Data Hiding (Live Hiding) Tools 
“Live hiding” tools hide data in main memory (Swanson, Stoller, & Carter, 1998). 
Main memory is volatile. Nevertheless, retrieval of the data can be done as long as there is 
electricity to keep memory data on the memory cells. Retrieval techniques are both 
hardware and software-based, and they are rather easy to implement because anti-forensic 
tools in the main memory do not try to hide themselves very much (Burdach, 2006). 
c. Network-Based Hiding Tools 
Network-based data-hiding tools hide data in one of the layers provided in the 
Internet Protocol Stack model. Techniques are covert channeling, protocol bending, and 
packet crafting (Bergel, 2007).  
Wrapping tools are a good example for network-based anti-forensic tools. They are 
common and easy to implement. The UNIX Stunnel tool is a well-known network-level 
SSL wrapper tool (Trojnara, 2016). It wraps unencrypted communication into a SSL 
tunnel. This tool was developed for providing a secure communication channel for insecure 
TCP/IP protocols. However, attackers can hide data using it. 
Terminal emulators are other network-based anti-forensic tools. However, terminal 
emulators require administrator/root privileges for an installation on a client machine. 
Common network emulators that can hide data are AbsoluteTelnet, Indigo Terminal 
Emulator, and SecureCRT (Conlan, et al., 2016). 
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) provides security for private networks over an 
insecure channel. VPN protocols use encryption for securing data. An attacker can 
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establish a client-server VPN for exfiltration of sensitive data or data hiding. Encapsulating 
VPN packets in another protocol is an alternative method for data hiding. A good example 
of VPN encapsulation is encapsulating VPN packets into an IP datagram, keeping the 
header information unchanged.  
d. Encryption Techniques 
A basic definition for the encryption is transforming data into a secret code (Beal, 
n.d.). Modern encryption algorithms can be synchronous or asynchronous. Encryption 
provides confidentiality and ways to hide data (Boneh, Sahai, & Waters, 2011). Common 
encryption targets are files, disks, email, file-systems, applications, and data in transit 
(Conlan et al., 2016). Whole-disk and file encryption is the focus of this thesis. Encryption 
disrupts the initial acquisition phase of the digital forensics examination so the examiner 
cannot complete the following phases. 
e. Steganography Techniques 
Steganography is techniques to hide secret information in image, video, audio, or 
text files so that the information cannot be detectable by a naked eye (Mishra et al., 2014). 
Distortion and spread-spectrum techniques are examples of audio steganography, and 
substitution techniques are examples of image steganography (Singh & Mahajan, 2016). 
In all steganography methods, encryption can be used too to provide extra protection 
against steganalysis. Comparing the aims of steganography and encryption, encryption puts 
content of the message in an undecipherable form, and steganography hides the message 
existence as well. Some example stenographic techniques are: 
• Substitution. This is the most common and easiest technique. An attacker 
uses redundant places to hide the secret message such as the least 
significant bits. 
• The discrete cosine transform on audio where one bit is modulated.  
• The spread-spectrum technique on audio. The attacker spreads the secret 
over a wide spectrum and then modulates it into the carrier signal.  
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• Distortion techniques. The information is encoded in the signal by 
distorting the cover. The difference between the original cover and the 
distorted one gives the secret. (Singh & Mahajan, 2016). 
f. Rootkits 
Rootkits are specialized code sectors that hide in the operating-system kernel 
(Hoglund & Butler, 2006). Rootkits are a type of malicious software that runs at the inner 
levels of an operating system. Cyber criminals use rootkits not only hiding data, but also 
for logging the network activity, storing keystrokes, process hiding, and controlling 
registry entries (Sparks & Butler, 2005).  
2. Artifact Wiping 
Artifact wiping is an effective method for destroying digital evidence. Garfinkel 
(2007) and Conlan et al. (2016) identified these methods: 
• Disk wiping erases data from a disk (hard or solid-state) securely. There 
are many publicly available disk-wiping tools of which Blancoo 5, DBAN, 
and WipeDisk are well known. Recent research show that the tools are 
easy to use and subsequent data retrieval is quite hard (Lillis et al., 2016).  
• Disk degaussing overwrites the data magnetically with zeros or random 
values. It is difficult today, but on older magnetic disks the Gutmann 
patterns enable investigators to retrieve data by using magnetic force 
microscopy (Garfinkel & Shelat, 2003).  
• Physical destruction techniques include melting, shredding, and 
incarnating (Kissel, Scholl, Skolochenko, & Li, 2012).  
• File wiping is similar to disk wiping but focused on files. Sdelete is the 
most common tool (Conlan et al., 2016). 
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• Generic data wiping tools differ from file wiping tools by erasing artifacts 
like cookies, temporary data, and Internet browsing history. A well-known 
generic data-wiping tool is CCleaner (Conlan et al., 2016). 
• Metadata wiping tools: Metadata is the data about the data. Metadata of a 
file stores times, ownership, size, etc. An example tool for metadata 
wiping is Timestomp. It is a part of the Mmetasploit framework 
(Garfinkel, 2007). Metadata wiping requires advanced knowledge and a 
successful exploit at the target system. 
• The Windows registry is a database storing operating system and 
application-specific settings for the Microsoft Windows operating system. 
Registry wiping tools remove unused, broken, or wrong registry entries 
(Conlan et al., 2016). 
• Removable-disk wiping uses similar techniques to that of disk wiping 
(Lillis et al., 2016). 
3. Trail Obfuscation 
This method is known as “counterfeiting” (Jain & Chhabra, 2014). Trail 
obfuscation adds misdirection to digital evidence (Harris, 2006). Misdirection includes 
timestamp modification, file defragmentation, and manipulation of log files. Any 
inconsistencies on those suggest a trail-obfuscation activity.  
4. Attacks against Digital Forensic Tools and Processes 
Conlan et al. (2016) described attacks against forensic tools. Analysis is the most 
important phase of forensic investigation, and file integrity is very important for a proper 
analysis. An attacker by detecting either image creation or analysis of the logical partitions 
(of files or directories) can alter the integrity of the evidence. 
Denial of service is another attack type against forensic tools. By depleting 
resources like the RAM and CPU required by the tools, an attacker can impede analysis 
(Jain & Chhabra, 2014). Anti-reverse engineering is another method against forensic tools. 
11 
One way is compression bombs. Current tools open compressed files like ”zip” files during 
the analysis of file system. Compression bombs are compressed files that when extracted 
gets bigger than the tool can handle, perhaps with recursively contained files.   
12 
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III. ANALYSIS OF ANTI-FORENSIC TOOLS 
We followed four steps for analysis of an anti-forensic tool: installation, 
configuration, usage, and analysis of the forensic artifacts on the victim system. As 
discussed above there are many anti-forensic tools. In choosing tools, the main criteria are 
effectiveness in circumventing forensics, availability, ease of usage, cross-platform 
capability, and resistance to cyber-attacks. More than 300 tools fit the criteria (Conlan, 
et al., 2016). Thus, we narrowed the focus of the choices by adding novelty, community 
support and popularity among the cyber criminals to the criteria list. Table 1 gives a short 
summary and Appendix A gives the full tool list considered. 
Table 1. Anti-forensic Tools 
Technique Sub Category Specific item analyzed here 
Data Hiding 1. File System Data Hiding BMAP and NTFS file streams 
2. Memory Data Hiding Explanation of the techniques 
3. Network-based Data Hiding Stunnel 
4. Encryption VeraCrypt Whole disk and file 
encryption, VeraCrypt Hidden 
OS and plausible deniability 
5. Steganography Audio 
Text using Hydan tool 
Image/video using home-
developed program for  gray-
scaled pictures 
Protocol 
6. Rootkits In general 
Artifact Wiping 1. Disk Wiping DBAN  
2. Disk Degaussing & 
Destruction 
In general 
3. File Wiping Sdelete and BitKiller 
4. Generic Data Wiping CCleaner 
5. Metadata Wiping Timestomp 
14 
Technique Sub Category Specific item analyzed here 
6. Registry Wiping In general 
7. Removable Disk Wiping In general 
Trail Obfuscation Log cleaners with the Metasploit 
framework. 
Attacks against Forensic Tools and Techniques Packers (7-zip, PECompact, 
UPX) 
 
A. DATA HIDING 
1. File System Data Hiding Tools and Techniques 
We chose the Bmap tool to investigate data hiding in slack space in UNIX 
environment. We installed Bmap version 1.0.17 on an Ubuntu 08.04 virtual machine with 
1 core CPU, 1 GB memory, 10 GB HDD, and a bridged network. For testing, two image 
files were created using “dd” command and mounted on the Ubuntu file system. Then a 
string (“secret”) was put into the slack space. Appendix B explains Bmap usage and the 
commands that were used. 
We extracted two image files from a virtual machine containing FAT32 and EXT3 
file systems. The test images represented two computers with hidden data in their slack 
space. We hid a string into both file systems using the Bmap “putslack” option.  
During the experiment, we altered to Bmap source code and recompiled it because 
it had not been updated since 2000. We compiled Bmap on Ubuntu 08.04 and created a 
text file using the command “echo ‘Testing bmap tool’ > text.txt.” The text.txt file had a 
large slack space at the end of the file-system block. We used “bmap --mode slack test.txt” 
to see the available slack space on the block. We ran “echo “secret” | bmap --mode putslack 
text.txt” to put the “secret” string into the slack space of the text.txt. Appendix B has a 
more detailed explanation. 
Initial examination was done using LINUX “strings” command. Figure 2 shows 
that it can extract strings in the slack space of an EXT3 file system but not a FAT32 file 
system. Secondly, we tried forensic tools to extract the hidden strings from the slack space. 
The Autopsy tool, installed on a Windows machine-GUI, could not extract them for 
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both file system types, but FTK Imager, Bulk Extractor using BEViewer, and TSK could 
extract it.  
 
Figure 2. FAT32 and EXT3 Strings Command Output 
For data hiding in NTFS file systems, we used the NTFS alternate data streams tool 
(ADS). NTFS metadata includes the files as shown at the Table 2; $DATA, $Boot, 
$BadClus and $MFT provide opportunities to hide data (Huebner et al., 2006). ADS 
constructs and alters metadata of NTFS files. It cannot be detected with forensic tools 
because it contains title, author, and other necessary metadata about a file. Forensic tools 
usually do not check the metadata. 
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Table 2. Metadata Files in NTFS. Adapted from Huebner et al. 
(2006). 
0 $MFT MFT 512B 
1 $MFTMirr Backup MFT 
2 $Log Transaction logs 
3 $Volume Volume information 
4 $AttrDef Attribute definition 
5 . (dot) Root directory of the system 
6 $BitMap Allocation status of all clusters 
7 $Boot Boot record 
8 $BadClus List of bad clusters 
9 $Secure Security and access control information 
10 $Upcase Converts lowercase characters to Unicode uppercase 
11 $Extend Extension directory 
12-15 Unnamed For future use 
24 $Extend  
 
The System Internals tool “lads.exe” can detect many data streams but not alternate 
ones. However, “streams.exe” and “streams64.exe” can detect them. Huebner et al. (2006) 
observed that detecting alternate data streams is laborious job and a forensics examiner can 
have difficulty discriminating between legitimate and malicious usage. A stream needs to 
be examined carefully with a hex editor. So alternate data streams are hard to conceal, and 
are more an obfuscation technique than a data-hiding technique.  
For the experiment, we created a pointer “evil.exe” in $DATA attribute of file 
normal.exe. This pointer can be detected using System Internals “streams64.exe” tool. 
Figure 3 shows that “streams64.exe” can extract the pointer in “normal.exe” which hides 
“evil.exe” although it resides in a different cluster of the NTFS. The pointer can also be in 
either the “author” or “title” attribute of the NTFS file so it will not attract attention during 
the forensic analysis. 
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Figure 3. Testing Alternate Data Streams  
2. Network-Communications Data Hiding 
Stunnel provides network-based data hiding of unencrypted traffic in an SSL-
protocol traffic using a self-signed certificate. Stunnel needs a server and a client. The user 
creates an SSL certificate using the OpenSSL library, and both server and client use the 
certificate. Appendix B has details about the installation and configuration. For testing, the 
topology shown in Figure 4 was established. The Netcat message-exchange utility was 
used to transfer data.  
 
Figure 4. Stunnel Topology Used for Experiments 
For the experiment, we generated symmetric encryption keys using OpenSSL. Keys 
were exchanged between the client and the server by another means of communication 
(IRC messaging) or manually. After that, we simulated insecure network communication 
using the “netcat” tool. The client started “netcat” on the localhost port 4489. Stunnel was 
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configured to get the messages on port 4489 and send them in SSL tunnel through the 
network interface. On the server side, a similar configuration was used; Netcat configured 
to listen on port 4489 and Stunnel was configured to get SSL messages and pass them to 
localhost port 4489. Appendix B has the configuration and terminal commands used for 
this experiment.  
Initially we analyzed the Stunnel communication between client and server. We 
used Wireshark, an open-source tool which captures network packages and analyzes them. 
Our aim was to capture TLSv 1.2 communication establishment messages. Those messages 
showed a client-server communication with a predefined symmetric key, which is an 
uncommon use of TLS. Normally, TLS uses PKI for exchanging keys between the server 
and the client.  
When the Stunnel communication ended, the only artifacts remaining were the 
installation packets and configuration files on the client and the server machine. TSK, FTK 
Imager, Magnet Forensics AXIOM, and Linux “grep” (with appropriate search strings) can 
detect and display installation and configuration files from the image files of the client and 
the server machines. However, if an attacker wants to better deceive a forensic investigator, 
they can recompile the Stunnel source under a different name. 
A key indicator of Stunnel is its certificate. The Stunnel certificate includes both 
the private key and certificate file in a single PEM file, which begins with a “BEGIN RSA 
PRIVATE KEY” string. This string shows that private and public keys are concatenated 
back to back. On the other hand, the certificate-authority signed certificate starts with 
“BEGIN CERTIFICATE” and it is in PKCS format. Figure 5 shows Stunnel and 
Microsoft-signed certificates to show starting statements and contents. 
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Figure 5. Stunnel Private Key and Certificate and Certificate-
Authority Signed Certificate 
Since Stunnel can also provide privacy to a legitimate communication, a forensic 
investigator needs to examine its configuration file. Figure 6 shows an example 
configuration file which secures HTTP traffic between a client browser and IP Address 
172.217.169.142 (www.google.com) on the port 443. A forensic investigator can examine 
the Stunnel configuration file to see if it was used for malicious purposes. 
 
Figure 6. The Stunnel Configuration for Improving Security 
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3. Using Encryption for Data Hiding 
A user can use encryption to hide data from a forensic investigation. We 
investigated the VeraCrypt encryption tool, which provides file, partition, and volume 
encryption (Idrix, n.d.). Our experiments used both standard and hidden volumes with 100 
MB disk space. The standard volume of VeraCrypt is an encrypted file container, which 
mounts itself when correct password is input to VeraCrypt. The hidden volume is a 
standard volume which contains another standard volume, and mounts itself only when the 
password of the hidden volume is input. If the user inputs the standard volume’s password, 
the hidden volume remains unmounted and standard volume mounts itself. This protective 
standard volume is called “outer” disk space/volume of the hidden volume. The hidden 
volume included 50 MB of “outer” disk space and the rest was 50 MB in size in our 
experiments  
In experiments, we stored three text files in the standard and hidden volumes. Our 
experimental environment was Windows 10 OS running on virtual platform of Oracle 
VBox. To examine the VeraCrypt tool and volumes, a VMDK-file to binary-file 
conversion was done. Hexadecimal value analysis of the two volume files showed that 
neither contained successive zero bytes. Filling out empty parts of the volume is a feature 
of VeraCrypt (Idrix, n.d.). However, empty parts in a file must be filled with zero bytes in 
Windows 10; seeing no successive zero bytes is a clue to use of VeraCrypt. Figure 7 shows 
that TSK-Autopsy forensic analysis tool tags volume files as possible encrypted files.  
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Figure 7. Forensic Analysis of VeraCrypt Volumes with TSK 
Autopsy and FTK Imager 
Detection of encrypted data in the hidden volume is harder than in the standard 
volume. The hidden volume provides deniable encryption and plausible deniability 
(Kedziora, Chow, & Susilo, 2017). This meant that the first part (outer volume) must hide 
the second part (hidden volume), and an investigator cannot collect information about 
second part by accessing the first part (Kedziora et al., 2017). However, after mounting the 
outer volume, entropy analysis of the mounted volume showed where the hidden volume 
starts. Kedziora et al. (2017) suggested that dramatic drops on entropy values indicates start 
and end points of hidden volume because the header files of the VeraCrypt volumes do not 
contain random data when compared with the whole image, even when a hidden volume 
created in a standard volume. Therefore, bit-entropy analysis of a VeraCrypt file yields 
information about the existence of a hidden volume. 
4. Steganography and Example Implementation 
We developed our own steganography application. It hides an image in another one 
by a substitution technique, the most common technique for text hiding (Mishra et al., 
2014). Substitution methods that are useful for text steganography include least-
significant-bit, random, and specific-bit replacements. Least-significant-bit image 
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steganography technique hides data into least-significant bits of image data, and there are 
many options on which bytes to change. We developed an image steganography program, 
which hides an image into a base image after encrypting it. It can hide half a grayscale 
secret image in a base image so that the human eye cannot detect the difference. 
Appendix B shows our implementation of this algorithm. Figure 8 displays the user 
interface to the tool. 
 
Figure 8. Data Hiding and Retrieval with a Simple Image 
Steganography Tool 
When a forensic analyst suspects the existence of steganography in an image file, 
it is helpful to examine the hexadecimal values of the bytes of the image files. Statistical 
analysis can suggest the existence of steganography in a file. Shannon (2001) suggests that 
entropy (H) can help us to understand the uncertainty of the information source, so unusual 
values for the entropy of a file can indicate steganography. However, examining each file 
and trying to recognize a particular implementation of steganography is still challenging. 
We tested steganography detection with two images in BMP format. We inserted a 
secret message into these files. However, hexadecimal analysis showed the resulting 
images were in PNG format (according to the Linux “file” command after examining their 
headers). AforgeNet.dll was used in the C# source code and it saves only in PNG format. 
Appendix B has the source code for the image steganography tool. 
We also wrote a Python program which creates a histogram of Shannon entropy 
values for the bytes. The original image for the example picture shown above has a byte 
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distribution shown in Figure 9. The image with steganography has fewer distinct values 
and no values over 127 (Figure 10). The differences suggest use of steganography. 
 
Figure 9. Histogram of Base Image in Test 
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Figure 10. Histogram of Steganography Image in Test 
B. ARTIFACT WIPING TECHNIQUES 
1. File Wiping 
We first tested a carving on a file marked as deleted. A file in text format was 
created on an Ubuntu 18.04 OS using FTKImager. Forensic analysis of the image found 
the file and all its metadata and data could be recovered as expected. After deleting the file, 
we used the “dd” tool to make a logical image of the drive by the command “sudo dd 
if=\dev\sda1 of=\media\sf_VM_share\shred1.raw bs=4096 conv=noerror,sync”. The 
Foremost, Scalpel, Autopsy, FTK, and FTKImager tools successfully retrieved the deleted 
file.  
Next, we used the Shred tool on the text file. The tool was installed on the Ubuntu 
18.04 using “sudo apt-get install shred” command. Then the Shred tool’s zeroing option 
was used once as seen in Figure 11. When contents of the file were retrieved using the 
“cat” command, nothing appears in the terminal window. Similarly, the forensic-tool 
analysis of the file showed that its size was zero and its contents were all zeros.  
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Figure 11. Output of the Shred Tool on a Wiped File 
We also examined the hexadecimal values in which the shredded file formerly 
resided. Examination provided no clues about the presence of the file. However, logs and 
folder names do report to the forensic analyst that Shred was used on a system.  
Sdelete and BitKiller deleted and overwrote files as well. Both tools provide DoD-
secure deleting options, and both are freeware. For testing the programs, we downloaded 
them to a virtual machine, a Windows 10 build 1809. Test folders were created with a text 
file. One copy of the file was deleted with Sdelete using the overwrite option, one copy 
was deleted with BitKiller, and one copy was deleted using the Windows File Explorer. 
We then created a raw logical disk image of “C” drive with FTK Imager, and used TSK, 
Autopsy, AXIOM, FTK Imager, and Foremost tools for analysis of the Windows image. 
No forensic tools could retrieve the deleted files from the image. However, memory 
analysis provides details about BitKiller if a memory image is made while BitKiller is 
running. Therefore Sdelete is better than BitKiller at concealment. 
2. Generic-Data Wiping and Registry Wiping 
Not only disks and files contain artifacts, but also web browsers, applications, and 
third-party tools. Generic wiping tools delete browser temporary Internet files, cookies, 
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caches, registry, and so on. One of the most common generic-artifact wiping tools is 
Piriform Ccleaner, a commercial Windows OS tool. According to Cnet.com, it has been 
downloaded nearly 161 million times. CCleaner overwrites a file at least three times with 
random data using the “rand ()” function in Windows to make the file data random. 
However, CCleaner is easy to see in a disk image since it creates an “.INI” file for storing 
configuration data under the directory “C:\Program Files\CCleaner.” Another indicator is 
the prefetch data mentioning “ccleaner” and “piriform.”  
3. Metadata Wiping 
We tested metadata wiping using the Metasploit Framework. The Experimental 
details and setup are in Appendix B. In our experiment, an attacker deleted timestamps of 
the file to conceal his tracks on the exploited system. We examined the file timestamps, 
saw big inconsistencies between the usual OS files and the manipulated ones. This is an 
indicator for metadata wiping activity. 
C. TRAIL OBFUSCATION 
We did a trail obfuscation experiment on the same setup we used for metadata 
wiping. Trail obfuscation adds extra information or takes out information from a system to 
mislead a forensic examiner. In our experiment, we deleted all event logs from a Windows 
system. This is a major indicator for trail obfuscation activity on the system. But a cyber-
criminal can also change some logs or create extra ones to further cover his tracks. 
D. ATTACKS AGAINST FORENSIC TOOLS AND PROCESSES 
Packers are file-compression tools and they can be used against forensic tools to 
provide code and data obfuscation. To analyze packers, we created a simple C code 
segment to print a sentence to the terminal window, then packed it with PECompact, 7-zip 
and UPX. Our results showed these packers compressed up to 70%. We ran the forensic 
tools FTKImager, Autopsy, TSK, AXIOM, and BelkaSoft. They all successfully detected 
that the compressed file contained an executable. When details of the executable were 
examined with IDA PRO, it was seen that the “magic number” identifying the type of file 
remained untouched. So packing alone is not a useful anti-forensics technique.  
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IV. MITIGATION OF ANTI-FORENSICS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
We analyzed four kinds of anti-forensics. Table 1 summarized our analysis 
methodology. Our analysis suggested that common anti-forensics techniques and tools can 
be detectable by their leaving important evidence material in various places. In this chapter 
tool-specific detection methods and mitigation techniques are presented. 
A. DATA HIDING  
1. Detection of File System Data Hiding 
We installed and used the Bmap tool in a Linux environment. Detection of the tool 
can be done by the “strings” tool for the EXT3 file system. If the file-system format is 
FAT32, then detection can be done by the forensic tools FTKImager, Bulk-Extractor, and 
TSK. 
A second file system data-hiding method is using ADS on an NTFS environment. 
Detection of ADS can be done using Microsoft System Internals “stream64.exe” tool. Our 
tests on ADS showed that it successfully detected a hidden stream in an executable that 
was pointing another malicious executable where the stream value was stored in $DATA 
attribute of the executable. However, a forensic analyst can easily miss that pointer. A more 
novel method for detection of ADS is to use PowerShell with following steps: 
• Collect the user-created files. 
• Run “Get-item -Path [file_path] -Stream * | Export-Csv <.csv_path> “ 
PowerShell cmdlet. 
• Analyze the CSV files to detect uncommon ADS values.  
• Run “Get-Content -Path <file_path> -Stream [uncommon_stream_name] 
>> Evidence_Streams.txt” PowerShell cmdlet. Common stream names 
such as $DATA, $AUTHOR, and $FILE_NAME are stored in the 
metadata of the file.  
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Current state-of-art forensic techniques do not provide a mitigation technique for 
ADS, because it has many valid usages. However, our PowerShell detection method can 
be turned into a script, which runs on the client and sends stream contents to a server for 
further analysis. 
2. Detection of Network Communication Data Hiding with Stunnel 
We tested Stunnel for data hiding. Stunnel communication is quite secure because 
it uses the SSL protocol. Network-traffic analysis did not reveal its hidden data. 
Communication initialization messages and socket communications (IP and port-tuple 
communications) were analyzed using Wireshark for network-traffic analysis, but there 
were no major indicators of the data hiding using Stunnel. There were clues in Stunnel 
configuration files, server-client TLS communication for high-end (>1024) ports, use of 
the OpenSSL library certificate, string search revelations of Stunnel keywords like stunnel, 
stunnel4, stunnel.conf, etc.), and the “var/run/stunnel.pid” file.  
Stunnel runs on the Linux. Stunnel requires OpenSSL library, a designated “uid” 
and “gid” pairs for Stunnel, and /var/run/stunnel.pid file, containing the “pid#” for Stunnel. 
A good mitigation against Stunnel is restricting users from creating or changing the Stunnel 
installation and configuration requirements. 
3. Detection and Mitigation Techniques against Encryption Usage for 
Data Hiding 
Encrypted files are hard to analyze without the key. Sometimes in a criminal 
investigation the key can be retrieved from the suspect. On the other hand, if analyst cannot 
detect any encrypted files, then they need to put mitigation techniques beforehand.  
Our experiments on VeraCrypt revealed that TSK-Autopsy did flag VeraCrypt 
volumes as encrypted files. Mitigation techniques against this method for the enterprise-
level networks are: 
• A good corporate file-server policy so users cannot map a file share, and 
only GPO or scripts can.  
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• Effective device control metrics. When a user plugs in a removable media, 
contents should be copied to a central location (an evidence folder) for 
examination. 
• Installing an executable must be disabled. If the user is a system 
administrator, installing the executable must be logged and monitored. It is 
important to prepare a master operating-system image containing all the 
required programs and executables. If a new executable is required, it 
must get approval from the change-management board. 
• Users should access encryption libraries such as OpenSSL only with 
approval. and encryption must be done when required at the background 
and not by users. 
4. Detection of Steganography 
Detection of the steganography depends on statistical analysis of the image files. 
We discussed image steganography in Chapter III and suggested using Shannon entropy 
for detecting anomalies in the cover image. However, this does require having both the 
base image and the final image  
B. ARTIFACT WIPING 
Detection of artifact wiping is easy by observing data patterns of 0s or 1s; however, 
retrieving the deleted data is cumbersome, and usually not possible. Mitigation methods 
against artifact wiping are thus important Mitigation techniques against the artifact wiping 
are possible for enterprise networks where there is a central server that maintains and 
administers the network. The server can employ rules to control user activity. Some things 
they need to manage are: 
• Artifact-wiping tools are cleaning tools that delete registry, temp files, 
browser history, and so forth. System administrators must prevent users 
from downloading and installing such tools. The list of tools at the 
Appendix A can serve as a guide. 
30 
• User-activity logs are valuable for detecting artifact-wiping activity. They 
can be saved in a SIEM log-collection database for integrated analysis. 
• System administrators need to prevent users from accessing system root 
files and folders. This includes the Windows “C:” drive and in Linux all 
the directories except user’s home director. 
• The ideal option is live forensic-artifact collection using an agent-based 
forensic application on the client systems. 
C. MITIGATION TECHNIQUES AGAINST TRAIL OBFUSCATION AND 
ATTACK AGAINST FORENSIC TOOLS 
Trail obfuscation tools misdirect the forensic analysis. Cyber criminals use it in the 
post-exploit phase of an attack. The best mitigation against the trail obfuscation is 
protecting the systems against a cyber-attack.  
We tested zip bombs and packers as attack methods against the forensic tools FTK 
Imager, TSK-Autopsy, and Magnet Forensic AXIOM. They can detect zip bombs and 
recover themselves against this attack. Success of the packers depends on the technique 
used. If a packaging method like UPX is used against forensic tools, detection is possible 
because UPX cannot hide the contents of the executable. On the other hand, the 7-Zip tool 
encrypts both contents and file names, so this tool is effective against initial forensic 
analysis. However, forensic examiners can provide findings of encryption and legal 
authorities can request keys and passwords. 
D. SUMMARY 
Anti-forensics techniques and tools are ever-changing. Therefore, a solid set of 
forensic tools is required combatting them. We first examined anti-forensic techniques and 
identified tools in a number of categories. We identified publicly available, popular, up-to-
date, and easy-to-use tools. Our experiments on selected tools showed that anti-forensic 
techniques do complicated well-known forensic practices. To detect each tool, forensic 
examiner must look different parts of the operating system and must follow different 
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methodologies. We suggested mitigation and detection techniques that can help forensic 
examiners to prevent anti-forensics or to detect its use.  
Important threats we have not examined are rootkits and malware activity. Future 
work should investigate mitigation and detection methods for them following our 
methodology. 
32 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
33 
APPENDIX A.  ANTI-FORENSIC TOOLS CONSIDERED 
Conlan et al. (2016) provided a list of 308 anti-forensic tools. A tool that supports 
multiple operating system and is an open-source, easy to download, easy to configure, and 
up-to-date was considered a good candidate for analysis.  
 
Tool Name Short Description 
AbsoluteTelnet Hiding tool. Network-based, Telnet emulator, Windows, up-to-date, 
commercial, 
http://www.celestialsoftware.net/. 
Ace encrypt Encryption. Windows and Linux, up-to-date, both freeware and 
commercial, no site available. 
Acid 
Cryptofiler 
Encryption. Windows, outdated (2008), http://acid-
cryptofiler.software.informer.com/7.1/. 
AdvFS Encryption. File-system level, 
Open-sourced, up-to-date. 
AES Crypt* Encryption. Windows, Linux, MacOS, mobile platforms. Open-source, up-
to-date, file-based encryption support, https://www.aescrypt.com/. 
Aloaha Crypt 
Disk 














Encryption. Latest version is 2014, 
https://github.com/thialfihar/apg. 
AxCrypt Encryption. Windows, MAC, IOS, Android. free and commercial, up-to-
date 
https://www.axcrypt.net/. 










Encryption. Commercial, up-to-date, Windows 
https://www.jetico.com/. 
Bitlocker Encryption. Windows. 
Bmap* Slack space hiding tool. Linux, open-source, obsolete. 
https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/17642/bmap-1.0.17.tar.gz.html. 
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Tool Name Short Description 
Boringssl Encryption. Data-in-transit, Forked Google developed SSL library.  
Botan  Encryption. Cross-platform, up-to-date, 
https://botan.randombit.net/. 




Ccrypt Encryption. Files and streams. Outdated, Windows and Linux, 
http://ccrypt.sourceforge.net/. 
Challenger* Encryption. Files, portable and local usage, secure deletion, Windows, up-
to-date, freeware and commercial, http://www.encryption-
software.de/challenger/en/index.html. 
CipherShed Encryption. Project forked from TrueCrypt, community failed to get 
support, cross platform, https://ciphershed.org/. 
CloudFogger Encryption. Files, cloud storage services, background working, cross 
platform, freeware, up-to-date, 
https://cloudfogger.en.softonic.com/?ex=REG-60.2. 
CrossCrypt* Encryption. CD/DVD encryption property is interesting, old, Windows, 
http://www.softpedia.com/get/Security/Encrypting/Cross-Crypt.shtml. 
Cryptainer Encryption. Windows, Up-to-date, freeware and commercial, 
https://www.cypherix.com/cryptainerle/. 
Cryptarchiver Encryption. Folders and disks. Windows, up-to-date, commercial. 
Cryptmount* Encryption. Mounts encrypted file systems without privileged user 
accounts, Linux, up-to-date, library, http://cryptmount.sourceforge.net/. 
CryptoCat* Encryption. Chat program, cross-platform, non-commercial, up-to-date, 
https://crypto.cat/. 
Cypherix* Encryption. Splits hard drive into small containers and encrypts them, 
Windows, up-to-date, commercial, 
https://www.cypherix.com/cryptainerpe/. 
DiskCryptor Encryption. Drives, Windows, freeware, 
https://diskcryptor.net/wiki/Main_Page. 
Dropbear Encryption.  SSH-based server, data-on-transit encryption, Linux, up-to-
date, https://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html. 
eCryptfs Encryption.  Drives and folders, Linux, up-to-date, open-source, 
http://ecryptfs.org/. 
Encrypted File 
System on AIX 
Encryption. Files, Linux, up-to-date, open-source. 
Ergosecure Wiping and encryption. Cross-platform, up-to-date, commercial. 
https://egosecure.com/en/. 
EncFS Encryption. Files, open-source, Linux, up-to-date, 
https://github.com/vgough/encfs. 
EncryptStick Encryption. Cross-platform, commercial, up-to-date, 
https://www.encryptstick.com/. 
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Tool Name Short Description 
GPG Encryption. Open-source, Linux, up-to-date, https://gnupg.org/, similar 
applications are Gpg4win and GPGmail. 








Steganography. Link layer, requires CSMA/CD or CA channel access to 
read all the sent messages to retrieve hidden secret, 
http://krzysiek.tele.pw.edu.pl/pdf/acs2003-hiccups.pdf. 
Hushmail Encryption and safe deletion. Cross platform, commercial, up-to-date, 
https://www.hushmail.com/. 
Hydan Steganography. Hides data into program executables, it is old but still 
works, Linux and Windows, http://www.crazyboy.com/hydan/. 
I.CX Encryption. Network, works on a web browser, 
https://i.cx/?icx.screen=home&convoId=0. 
IAI-JCE Encryption. Cross-platform, commercial, https://jce.iaik.tugraz.at/. 
Imagespyer 
G2* 




Encryption and steganography. Windows, commercial, up-to-date, 
http://www.invisiblesecrets.com/. 
Keepass Encryption. Passwords, Cross-platform, up-to-date, open-source, 
https://keepass.info/. 
Lastpass Encryption. Passwords and files, Cross-platform, up-to-date, freeware and 
commercial, https://www.lastpass.com/. 
Libressl Encryption. OpenBSD and cross-platform, up-to-date, forked from 
OpenSSL, https://www.libressl.org/. 




Encryption. Drives, Linux, up-to-date, open source, 
https://sourceforge.net/projects/luks-manager/. 
MagicFS* Steganography with encryption. Data hiding in a ext2/3 file systems, 
Linux, up-to-date, open-source, http://magikfs.sourceforge.net/. 
Mail1Click Encryption. Web-based, cross platform, commercial and freeware, 
https://www.mail1click.com. 
MatrixSSL Encryption. Cross-platform, up-to-date, small fingerprint, 
https://github.com/matrixssl/matrixssl. 
Mbed TLS Encryption. Cross-platform, written in C, up-to-date, https://tls.mbed.org/. 








Tool Name Short Description 




Encryption. Windows, old, freeware, 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/02/mujahideen_secr_1.html. 
NetPGP Encryption. OpenBSD, cross-platform, http://netpgp.com/. 
One big cloud 
(CloudZ) 
Encryption. For cloud file-sharing applications like Google Drive, 
Dropbox, freeware and commercial, https://cloudz.io/. 
OpenPuff Steganography. Open-source, cross-platform, up-to-date, 
http://www.embeddedsw.net/OpenPuff_Steganography_Home.html. 
OpenSSH Encryption.  SSH traffic, OpenBSD, cross-platform, up-to-date, 
https://www.openssh.com/. 
OpenSSL Encryption. For TLS and SSL,  open-source, cross platform, up-to-date, 
https://www.openssl.org/. 
OurSecret Steganography. Windows, http://steganography.findmysoft.com/. 
Password Safe Password encryption. Freeware, Windows, https://www.pwsafe.org/. 






Encryption. File systems for UNIX/Linux, open-source, up-to-date, PEFS 
(Private encrypted file system) on FreeBSD. 
Private Disk Disk encryption. Windows, commercial, 
https://www.dekart.com/products/encryption/private_disk/. 
Proxy Crypt File encryption. Windows, up-to-date, open source, 
https://sourceforge.net/projects/proxycrypt/. 
Quick Crypto Steganography and encryption. Windows, commercial, up-to-date, 
http://quickcrypto.com/download.html. 
Red JPEG XT Steganography. Windows, https://totalcmd.net/plugring/redjpeg.html. 
Rohos mini 
drive* 
Encryption. USB drive files,Windows, up-to-date, freeware 
https://www.rohos.com/products/rohos-disk-encryption/rohos-mini-drive/. 
Sbwave Encryption. Email, freeware, Windows, 
http://www.sbwave.com/enkryptor/home.html. 
Scramdisk Disk encryption. Linux, open-source, 
http://www.securiteam.com/tools/5VP011F0BY.html. 
SecureDoc Encryption. Holographic data hiding, watermarking, commercial, cross-
platform, https://www.winmagic.com/. 
SypproofVPN Encryption. Data-in-transit, commercial, cross-platform, 
http://spyproof.net/. 
StegFS Steganography. Linux and FreeBSD, open-source, 
https://sourceforge.net/projects/stegfs/. 
strongSwan Encryption. Linux, open-source, https://strongswan.org/. 
Stunnel* Encryption. Data-in-transit, Linux, Windows, open-source, 
https://www.stunnel.org/. 
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Drive encryption. Windows, commercial, 
https://www.symantec.com/products/endpoint-encryption. 
TrueCrypt Encryption. Cross-platform, open-source, obsolete, 
http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/. 
USBCrypt Encryption. Flash drives, commercial, Windows, 
http://www.usbcrypt.com/. 
Vera Crypt* Encryption. Cross-platform, forked from True Crypt, up-to-date, 
https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Home.html. 
ViPNet Office Encryption.  VPN, data-in-transit, Windows, http://vipnet-
office.download3000.com/. 
Win PT Encryption. Windows, open-source, up-to-date, 
http://winpt.wald.intevation.org/. 
WolfSSL Encryption. Internet of things, TLS support, light weight library for C 
programming language, up-to-date, Gnu License, 
https://www.wolfssl.com/. 
Zfone Encryption. Data-in-transit, VoIP, open-source, http://zfoneproject.com/ 
ZFS Encryption. Linux and UNIX, open-source, http://zfsonlinux.org/. 
Artifact Wiping Tools 
ACleaner Browser, application, and Windows registry data cleaner, up-to-date, 
freeware, 
http://www.cleanersoft.com/cleaner/privacy_registry_cleaner.htm. 









Hard disk cleaner, wiping tool, Windows, beta version, http://aevita-erase-
hard-drive.en.lo4d.com/. 
Aevita Wipe & 
Delete 



















Registry wiping, Windows, freeware, up-to-date, 
https://www.auslogics.com/en/software/registry-cleaner/. 
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Tool Name Short Description 
Baidu PC 
Faster 
Generic wiping tool, Windows, up-to-date, http://www.pcfaster.com/en/. 
BCWipe Data wiping, cross-platform, up-to-date, commercial, 
https://www.jetico.com/downloads/data-wiping. 
BitKiller Data wiping, Windows, freeware, not very new, relatively basic tool, 
http://www.snapfiles.com/get/bitkiller.html. 




Data wiping, Windows, up-to-date, freeware, 
http://www.cbldatarecovery.com/data-shredder/. 
CCleaner* Generic data cleaner, wiping tool, freeware and commercial, suitable for 
home-use, up-to-date, https://www.ccleaner.com/ccleaner. 
Cleanersoft 
Registry Fix 
Registry wiping, Windows, freeware, up-to-date, 
http://www.cleanersoft.com/registry_fix/free_registry_fix.htm. 
CyberScrub Firm provides wiping tool for generic data wiping, Windows, commercial, 
http://www.cyberscrub.com/. 
DBAN* Hard disk wiping tool, cross-platform, freeware, up-to-date, 
https://dban.org/. 









File wiping, Windows, freeware, up-to-date, 
https://www.ghacks.net/2008/05/09/dp-secure-wiper-removes-files-
securely-from-your-system/. 
East-tec Eraser Generic data wiper, Windows, commercial, up-to-date, https://www.east-
tec.com/eraser/. 





Registry wiping, fixing tool, Windows, freeware, not new, 
http://www.eusing.com/free_registry_cleaner/registry_cleaner.htm. 









Registry wiping, Windows, freeware, not new, 
http://download.cnet.com/Free-Window-Registry-Repair/3000-2086_4-
10606555.html. 
Freeraser File wiping, Windows, freeware, not new, http://www.freeraser.com/ 
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Tool Name Short Description 








Complete hard disk wiping, Windows, freeware, 
http://www.harddriveeraser.org/. 
Hardwipe Disk wiping, Windows, freeware, up-to-date, http://hardwipe.com/. 
HDDerase Bootable disk wiping tool, cross-platform, not new, 
https://www.lifewire.com/hdderase-review-2619137. 

















Registry wiping, fixing, commercial, up-to-date, 
https://www.pointstone.com/download/. 
Powertools Lite Generic wiping, disk wiping, registry fixing, up-to-date, Windows, 
commercial, https://www.macecraft.com/download/. 




Data wiping, Windows, commercial, up-to-date, 
https://www.protectstar.com/en/products/data-shredder. 




Registry wiping, freeware, Windows, up-to-date, 
https://www.registryrecycler.com/. 
Registry Repair Registry fixing, Windows, freeware, up-to-date, 
http://download.cnet.com/Free-Window-Registry-Repair/3000-2086_4-
10606555.html. 












Wiping tool for files, Windows, commercial, up-to-date, http://www.r-
wipe.com/. 
Sdelete System Internals tool from Windows, Wiping, Windows, freeware, up-to-
date, https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sdelete. 
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Tool Name Short Description 
Secure Clean Wiping tool, Windows, commercial, up-to-date, 
https://www.whitecanyon.com/home-products/secureclean. 




File eraser, Windows, freeware, up-to-date, http://www.securely.co/. 
SlimCleaner 
Free 





Generic wiping, Windows, up-to-date, freeware and commercial, 
http://www.iolo.com/downloads/download-system-mechanic/. 








Disk wiping tool. Windows, freeware, up-to-date, 
http://www.tweaknow.com/SecureDelete.php. 





File removal tool. Windows, freeware, up-to-date, http://www.lizard-
labs.com/xt_file_shredder_lizard.aspx. 
Ya- wipe  Disk degaussing, cross-platform, obsolete, 
http://freshmeat.sourceforge.net/projects/ya-wipe.  






Bitblinder  Anonymous P2P, https://bitblinder.en.uptodown.com/windows. 
Fake Location GPS data obfuscation for mobile, http://download.cnet.com/Fake-
Location/3000-12941_4-75463190.html. 
Filetopia P2P sharing, cross-platform, http://www.filetopia.org/. 
GNUnet Secure P2P, https://gnunet.org/. 
I2P* Anonymous networking, cross-platform, https://geti2p.net/en/. 
I2P-bote Anonymous email service using I2P network, 
https://github.com/i2p/i2p.i2p-bote.  
IMule Anonymous P2P, https://imule.en.softonic.com/. 
JonDonym Anonymous proxy and web surfing, https://anonymous-proxy-
servers.net/en/index2.html. 
Marabunta Anonymous free-net P2P, http://marabunta.laotracara.com/english.php. 
MUTE Anonymous P2P network, file sharing, 
https://sourceforge.net/projects/mute-net/. 
41 
Tool Name Short Description 
Netsukuku Anonymous P2P, free-net project, 
https://github.com/Netsukuku/netsukuku. 
OFFSystem Highly connected P2P network, http://offsystem.sourceforge.net/. 
OneSwarm Private P2P sharing, http://www.oneswarm.org/. 
Perfect Dark P2P file sharing, http://kasumi.moe/pd/. 
Retroshare Encrypted chat, mail, share using Tor / I2P, http://retroshare.net/. 
StealthNet Anonymous file sharing, http://www.stealthnet.de/en_index.php. 
Stego Share File sharing using steganography, http://stegoshare.sourceforge.net/. 
Tribler Anonymous, Tor-based P2P, https://www.tribler.org/.  
Attacks against forensic tools and methods 
7-zip Program packer, hard to analyze, initially archive needs unpacking, 
http://www.7-zip.org/. 
BitCrypter Program Packet, commercial, https://www.crypter.com/download.html. 
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APPENDIX B.  INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANTI-FORENSIC TOOLS 
A. BMAP TOOL INSTALLATION, CONFIGURATION PROCESS AND 
USAGE EXAMPLE 
BMAP (Robertson, 2003) can be downloaded from the packetstormsecurity 
website (the link is provided at the Appendix-A). After downloading the TARBALL, the 
following steps (listed below) are enough for correct compilation of the tool. 
•  tar -vxzf bmap-1.0.17.tar.gz 
• cd bmap-1.0.7 
• make 
• sudo ln -s /home/<user>/Desktop/bmap-1.0.17/bmap /sbin/bmap 
• bmap –help 
If the last command displays options of bmap tool, then the installation is completed 
successfully. Using dd if=/dev/zero of=fileEXT3.fs bs=1024 count=10240 creates a 10MB 
raw image file. Using mkfs.ext3 changes the raw image file to ext3 file system type. 
Following that, a user can mount the ext3 file system to a temp directory, navigate to the 
mounted temp directory, and use the following bmap options to hide a “secret” string in 
the slack space. 
• echo “Testing bmap tool” > text.txt 
• bmap --mode slack test.txt (displays slack space) 
• echo “secret” | bmap --mode putslack text.txt 
• bmap --mode slack test.txt (displays same slack space in step-2) 
On Windows one can repeat the same four steps and unmount file systems. 
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B. STUNNEL TOOL INSTALLATION, CONFIGURATION AND USAGE 
For installing Stunnel, the user needs to download the corresponding package and 
follow the installation directives. The best practice for Stunnel is configuring a Linux host 
as the server and either Windows or Linux host as the client. Stunnel needs a Linux package 
management environment such as dpkg. The installation is: 
• apt-get update  
• apt-get upgrade 
• apt-get install stunnel4 
This provides just the application. Specific configurations, SSL certificate setup, 
and service adjustments are also required. The list below shows the additional steps. 
• vi /etc/stunnel/stunnel.conf 
• Change “ENABLED = 1” for auto-start. 
• Generate a key using OpenSSL: 
• # openssl genrsa –out key.pem 2048 
• Create a certificate for SSL communication: 
• # openssl –req –new –x509 –key key.pem –out cert.pem –days 1095 
• # cat key.pem cert.pem >> /etc/stunnel/stunnel.pem 
Customize the configuration according to the topology at hand. The Stunnel default 
configuration file has options for IMAPS, https, POP3s, and TLS communication. An 
example configuration for the server is: 
• setuid = stunnel4 
• setgid = stunnel4 
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• pid = /var/run/stunnel.pid (stunnel.pid needs to be created beforehand 
including pid#) 
• client = no 
• [https] (accurate service name is required) 
• accept = 4488 
• connect  = 127.0.0.1:4489 
• cert = / etc/stunnel/stunnel.pem 
• An example configuration for Linux client is: 
• setuid = stunnel4 
• setgid = stunnel4 
• pid = /var/run/stunnel.pid (stunnel.pid needs to be created beforehand 
including pid#) 
• client = yes 
• accept = 4488 
• connect = 4489 
• cert = / etc/stunnel/stunnel.pem (certificate needs to be transferred from 
server to client) 
• /etc/init.d/stunnel4 restart (on both OSes). 
C. IMAGE STEGANOGRAPHY TOOL SOURCE CODE  








    static class Program 
    { 
        [STAThread] 
        static void Main() 
        { 
            Application.EnableVisualStyles(); 
            Application.SetCompatibleTextRenderingDefault(false); 
            Application.Run(new Form1()); 
        } 
    } 
} 
 











    public partial class Form1 : Form 
    { 
        public Form1() 
        { 
            InitializeComponent(); 
        } 
 
        private void buttonBrowseSimple_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            OpenFileDialog fileDiag = new OpenFileDialog(); 
            fileDiag.Filter = “Bitmap Image (.bmp)|*.bmp| Gif Image (.gif)|*.gif| JPG 
Image (.jpg) |*.jpg| Png Image (.png)|*.png”; 
 
            if (fileDiag.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                pictureBoxSimple.ImageLocation = fileDiag.FileName; 
                buttonBrowseSecret.Enabled = true; 
            } 
        } 
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        private void buttonBrowseSecret_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            OpenFileDialog fileDiag = new OpenFileDialog(); 
            fileDiag.Filter = “Bitmap Image (.bmp)|*.bmp| Gif Image (.gif)|*.gif | JPG 
Image (.jpg)|*.jpg| Png Image (.png)|*.png”; 
 
            if (fileDiag.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                Bitmap image = new Bitmap(fileDiag.FileName); 
                pictureBoxSecret.Image = ToGreyScale(image); 
                buttonSaveAsGrey.Enabled = true; 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void buttonExit_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            Application.Exit(); 
        } 
 
        // converts RGB values to grey scale 
        private Bitmap ToGreyScale(Bitmap bitmap) 
        { 
            int grey, i, j; 
            Color color; 
            for (i = 0; i < bitmap.Width; i++) 
            { 
                for (j = 0; j < bitmap.Height; j++) 
                { 
                    color = bitmap.GetPixel(i, j); 
                    grey = (int)((color.R + color.G + color.B) / 3); 
                    bitmap.SetPixel(i, j, Color.FromArgb(grey, grey, grey)); 
                } 
            } 
            return bitmap; 
        } 
 
        private void textBox1_TextChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            if (textBoxKey.Text.Trim().Length < 4) 
            { 
                buttonGenerate.Enabled = false; 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxKey, “Key length must be greater than 
3.”); 
                return; 
            } 
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            else 
            { 
                buttonGenerate.Enabled = true; 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxKey, ““); 
            } 
 
            try 
            { 
               int.Parse(textBoxKey.Text); 
               errorProvider.SetError(textBoxKey, ““); 
            } 
            catch (FormatException) 
            { 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxKey, “Key must be number.”); 
                return; 
            } 
        } 
        // Saves only in BMP format 
        private void buttonSaveAs_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            SaveFileDialog fileDiagSave = new SaveFileDialog(); 
            fileDiagSave.Filter = “Bitmap Image (.bmp)|*.bmp”; 
 
            if (fileDiagSave.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                pictureBoxResult.Image.Save(fileDiagSave.FileName); 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void buttonDecryption_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            groupBoxEncryption.Visible = false; 
            groupBoxDecryption.Visible = true; 
        } 
 
        private void buttonEncryption_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            groupBoxEncryption.Visible = true; 
            groupBoxDecryption.Visible = false; 
        } 
 
        private void Form1_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            groupBoxDecryption.Visible = false; 
            groupBoxEncryption.Visible = true; 
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        } 
 
        private void BrowseDecrypt_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            OpenFileDialog ofd = new OpenFileDialog(); 
            ofd.Filter = “Bitmap Image (.bmp)|*.bmp|Gif Image (.gif)|*.gif |JPEG 
Image (.jpeg)|*.jpeg |Png Image (.png)|*.png “; 
            if (ofd.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                pictureBoxEncryptedImage.ImageLocation = ofd.FileName; 
            } 
        } 
        // Creates a Byte Array 
        private byte getByte(byte[] bits) 
        { 
            String bitString = ““; 
            for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) 
                bitString += bits[i]; 
            byte newpix = Convert.ToByte(bitString, 2); 
            int dePix = (int)newpix ^ key; 
            return (byte)dePix; 
        } 
 
        private byte[] getBits(byte simplepixel) 
        { 
            int pixel = 0; 
            pixel = (int)simplepixel ^ key; 
            BitArray bits = new BitArray(new byte[] { (byte)pixel }); 
            bool[] boolarray = new bool[bits.Count]; 
            bits.CopyTo(boolarray, 0); 
            byte[] bitsArray = boolarray.Select(bit => (byte)(bit ? 1 : 0)).ToArray(); 
            Array.Reverse(bitsArray); 
            return bitsArray; 
        } 
 
        int key = 0; 
        private void ButtonGenerate_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            Bitmap simple = new Bitmap(pictureBoxSimple.Image); 
            Bitmap secretGreyScale = new Bitmap(pictureBoxSecret.Image); 
 
            if (secretGreyScale.Height != simple.Height || secretGreyScale.Width != 
simple.Width) 
            { 
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                ResizeBilinear resizeFilter = new ResizeBilinear(simple.Width, 
simple.Height); 
                secretGreyScale = resizeFilter.Apply(secretGreyScale); 
            } 
            // Initialize 
            Color pixelContainerImage = new Color(); 
            Color pixelMsgImage = new Color(); 
            // get key in Integer 
            key = int.Parse(textBoxKey.Text); 
 
            byte[] MsgBits; 
            byte[] AlphaBits; 
            byte[] RedBits; 
            byte[] GreenBits; 
            byte[] BlueBits; 
 
            byte newAlpha = 0; 
            byte newRed = 0; 
            byte newGreen = 0; 
            byte newBlue = 0; 
 
            /* Image Encryption */ 
            #region Encryption 
 
            for (int i = 0; i < simple.Height; i++) 
            { 
                for (int j = 0; j < simple.Width; j++) 
                { 
                    pixelMsgImage = secretGreyScale.GetPixel(j, i); 
                    MsgBits = getBits((byte)pixelMsgImage.R); 
                    pixelContainerImage = simple.GetPixel(j, i); 
                    AlphaBits = getBits((byte)pixelContainerImage.A); 
                    RedBits = getBits((byte)pixelContainerImage.R); 
                    GreenBits = getBits((byte)pixelContainerImage.G); 
                    BlueBits = getBits((byte)pixelContainerImage.B); 
 
                    AlphaBits[6] = MsgBits[0]; AlphaBits[7] = MsgBits[1]; 
                    RedBits[6] = MsgBits[2]; RedBits[7] = MsgBits[3]; 
                    GreenBits[6] = MsgBits[4]; GreenBits[7] = MsgBits[5]; 
                    BlueBits[6] = MsgBits[6]; BlueBits[7] = MsgBits[7]; 
 
                    newAlpha = getByte(AlphaBits); 
                    newRed = getByte(RedBits); 
                    newGreen = getByte(GreenBits); 
                    newBlue = getByte(BlueBits); 
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                    pixelContainerImage = Color.FromArgb(newAlpha, newRed, 
newGreen, newBlue); 
                    simple.SetPixel(j, i, pixelContainerImage); 
                } 
            } 
            pictureBoxResult.Image = simple; 
            buttonSaveAs.Enabled = true; 
            #endregion 
        } 
 
        private void btnDecrypt_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            Bitmap EncryptedImage = (Bitmap)pictureBoxEncryptedImage.Image; 
            Bitmap hiddenImage = new Bitmap (EncryptedImage.Width, 
EncryptedImage.Height); 
            Color pixelToDecrypt = new Color(); 
            try 
            { 
                key = int.Parse(textBoxDecryptionKey.Text); 
            } 
            catch (FormatException ) 
            { 
                MessageBox.Show(“Key must be number.”); 
                return; 
            } 
 
            byte[] BitsToDecrypt = new byte[8]; 
            byte[] AlphaBits; 
            byte[] RedBits; 
            byte[] GreenBits; 
            byte[] BlueBits; 
            byte newGrey = 0; 
            /* Image Decryption */ 
            #region Decryption 
 
            for (int i = 0; i < EncryptedImage.Height; i++) 
            { 
                for (int j = 0; j < EncryptedImage.Width; j++) 
                { 
                    pixelToDecrypt = EncryptedImage.GetPixel(j, i); 
 
                    AlphaBits = getBits((byte)pixelToDecrypt.A); 
                    RedBits = getBits((byte)pixelToDecrypt.R); 
                    GreenBits = getBits((byte)pixelToDecrypt.G); 
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                    BlueBits = getBits((byte)pixelToDecrypt.B); 
 
                    BitsToDecrypt[0] = AlphaBits[6]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[1] = AlphaBits[7]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[2] = RedBits[6]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[3] = RedBits[7]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[4] = GreenBits[6]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[5] = GreenBits[7]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[6] = BlueBits[6]; 
                    BitsToDecrypt[7] = BlueBits[7]; 
 
                    newGrey = getByte(BitsToDecrypt); 
                    pixelToDecrypt = Color.FromArgb(newGrey, newGrey, newGrey); 
                    hiddenImage.SetPixel(j, i, pixelToDecrypt); 
                } 
            } 
            pictureBoxExtractedImage.Image = hiddenImage; 
            buttonSaveAsFinal.Enabled = true; 
            #endregion 
        } 
 
        private void buttonSaveAsFinal_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            SaveFileDialog sfd = new SaveFileDialog(); 
            sfd.Filter = “Bitmap Image (.bmp)|*.bmp|Gif Image (.gif)|*.gif |JPEG 
Image (.jpeg)|*.jpeg |Png Image (.png)|*.png “; 
 
            if (sfd.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                pictureBoxExtractedImage.Image.Save(sfd.FileName); 
            } 
        } 
 
        private void button3_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            SaveFileDialog sfd = new SaveFileDialog(); 
            sfd.Filter = “Bitmap Image (.bmp)|*.bmp|Gif Image (.gif)|*.gif |JPEG 
Image (.jpeg)|*.jpeg |Png Image (.png)|*.png “; 
             
            if (sfd.ShowDialog() == DialogResult.OK) 
            { 
                pictureBoxSecret.Image.Save(sfd.FileName); 
            } 
        } 
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        private void T_BoxDecryptionKey_TextChanged(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            if (textBoxDecryptionKey.Text.Trim().Length < 4 && 
textBoxDecryptionKey.Text.Trim().Length > 7) 
            { 
                btnDecrypt.Enabled = false; 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxDecryptionKey, “Key length must be 
greater than 3 .”); 
                return; 
            } 
            else 
            { 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxDecryptionKey, ““); 
                btnDecrypt.Enabled = true; 
            } 
            try 
            { 
                int.Parse(textBoxDecryptionKey.Text); 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxDecryptionKey, ““); 
            } 
            catch (FormatException) 
            { 
                errorProvider.SetError(textBoxDecryptionKey, “Key must be 
number.”); 
                return; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
}} 
 
D. PYTHON SCRIPT FOR SHANNON ENTROPY CALCULATIONS 
# entropy.py 
# 
# Shannon Entropy of a file 





if len(sys.argv) != 2: 
    print(‘Usage: file_entropy.py [path]filename’) 
    sys.exit() 
 
# read the whole file into a byte array 
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f = open(sys.argv[1], “r”) 
byteArr = map(ord,f.read()) 
f.close() 
fileSize = len(byteArr) 
print(‘File size in bytes:’) 
print(‘fileSize’) 
 
# calculate the frequency of each byte value in the file 
freqList = [] 
for b in range(256): 
    ctr = 0 
    for byte in byteArr: 
        if byte == b: 
            ctr += 1 
    freqList.append(float(ctr) / fileSize) 
# Shannon entropy 
ent = 0.0 
for freq in freqList: 
    if freq > 0: 
        ent = ent + freq * math.log(freq, 2) 
ent = -ent 
print(‘Shannon entropy (min bits per byte-character):’) 
print(ent) 
print(‘Min possible file size assuming max theoretical compression efficiency:’) 
print (ent * fileSize), ‘in bits’ 
print (ent * fileSize) / 8, ‘in bytes’ 
 
import numpy as np 
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt 
 
N = len(freqList) 
ind = np.arange(N)  # the x locations for the groups 
width = 1.00  # the width of the bars 
 
# fig = plt.figure() 
fig = plt.figure(figsize=(11, 5), dpi=100) 
ax = fig.add_subplot(111) 






ax.set_title(‘Frequency of Bytes 0 to 255\nFILENAME: ‘ + sys.argv[1]) 
plt.show() 
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E. METADATA WIPING AND TRAIL OBFUSCATION EXPERIMENTS 
In this experiment target’s user used his PC for daily activities. 
• The target machine is Windows 7 and the attacker machine is Kali-Linux.
Both operating systems share the same network. Windows IP address is
10.0.0.10 and Kali-Linux IP address is 10.0.0.5. Wireshark ran on the host
OS for capturing intermediary traffic between two machines.
• In the Kali-Linux to start Metasploit, the PostgreSQL service is started
with t“service PostgreSQL start” and the “ss –ant” command is used to
check the state of the PostgreSQL. Next initialize the database by using
“msfdb init” command. Next start metasploit with the “msfconsole”
command. Simultaneously, nmap search is used to detect the OS version,
the IP address, and the open ports of the target OS.
• On the Windows side, user created a test file (C:\FP.txt). Initial file name
was “forensics Project Test File.” The file name is changed to “FP.txt” for
easy access the file from “msfconsole” during the exploit.
• Using exploit ms15_100_mcl_exe requires the user to open a purposely-
crafted Windows Media Player list. Then the payload (.mcl) initiates a
reverse TCP connection from target machine to attacker machine using
crafted mcl.exe on port 4444 (Figure 12).
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Figure 12. Test File Timestamps 
 
Figure 13. Result of Timestamp Change with timestomp 
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F. EVENT LOG MANIPULATION 
After deleting or changing timestamps, an attacker can delete evidence of their 
presence on the system. For achieving this Metasploit provides “clearev” tool. 
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